I. Introduction
The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)1 provides that district courts “shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations.” After lying in desuetude for nearly two centuries, the ATCA was
reinvigorated by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,2 in which the Second Circuit held that official
torture was justiciable under the ATCA. Filartiga was followed by a line of cases using
the ATCA as a nexus to bring suit against numerous violations of international law by
both individuals and corporations. This activity spurred criticism of Filartiga and its
progeny on legal and policy grounds. There has also been substantial division over
whether the ATCA constitutes a jurisdictional grant or a wholesale incorporation of the
law of nations into federal law, at least for this limited purpose.3
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28 U.S.C. § 1350 (9). There has been some conflict over nomenclature between those
who prefer the moniker “Alien Tort Statute” (ATS) and those who prefer ATCA. See,
e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Teaches
about the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 111, 113 (Nov. 2004);
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 Va. J. Int’l. L. 587, 592-93
(2002). Since I argue the statute in question has a substantive component – that is,
provides causes of action for torts without other statutory corroboration – I use ATCA.
This is not mutually exclusive from saying the statute is jurisdictional in nature; instead,
the statute confers jurisdiction on federal courts to recognize causes of action for torts
without other statutory corroboration. As a result, I do not disagree with the claim that the
ATCA is a jurisdictional statute made in Sosa and in, e.g., Michael Garcia and Arthur
Traldi, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT ON U.S.
LAW, Congressional Research Service Report, Aug. 11, 2004. Rather, I use ATCA to
distinguish my view from those who consider the fact the statute’s jurisdictional nature to
preclude it from being a source of new causes of action.
2
630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir.1980).
3
The ATCA was not the first statute in the former colonies to provide civil liability for
international torts. See, e.g., An Act to Prevent Infractions of the Laws of Nations, in
Acts and Laws Passed by the General Court or Assembly of His Majesties English
Colony of Connecticut, January 1780-October 1783 at 602-03 (Timothy Green 1783)
(authorizing civil actions against citizens violating the law of nations). Nor was the
ATCA’s deference to international law out of place in early American law. See, e.g.,
Beth Stevens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After
Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393, 402 (1997) (arguing that the Framers were concerned with
1

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain4 began to resolve this question, holding that only those
torts substantially analogous to piracy, violations of safe passage, and offenses against
ambassadors – the torts over which the first Congress intended to provide jurisdiction –
are actionable under the ATCA.5 Problematically, however, the court also explicitly
upheld Filartiga. Consequently, Sosa failed to resolve the conflict between the two major
paradigms of actionable offenses which have arisen in the academic literature as well as
the caselaw. I term these the torture paradigm and the piracy paradigm. As a result of this
ambiguity, scholars on both sides of the debate declared victory.6
This Note lays out the development of the ATCA and of the jus gentium (law of
nations) into contemporary customary international law, as well as the two existent
paradigms of ATCA interpretation, and establishes that Sosa is inconsistent with either
extreme position. Since the Court’s holding in Sosa is under-theorized, this Note crafts a
reasonable middle ground between the two paradigms: holding all universal jurisdiction
offenses (and those significantly analogous) civilly actionable under the ATCA.7 It then

following international law to avoid creating causus belli for a European power). Even
before the Constitutional Convention, some U.S. courts had applied the principle
suggested by the ATCA. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784)
(“[The law of nations], in its full extent, is a part of the law of this state, and is to be
collected from the practice of different nations, and the authority of writers”).
4
124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
5
See 4. W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 67 (1769). See, e.g., Sosa
at 2756 (“It was this narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial
remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs,
that was probably on the minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to
tort”).
6
Compare Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 113 (claiming Sosa “mostly” accepted the
piracy paradigm), with William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law
in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, forthcoming in TULSA J. OF
COMP. & INT’L. L., at 2 (Sosa “endorsed the Filartiga line of cases”).
7
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (C.A.D.C., 1984).
2

uses Yousef8 as well as the Princeton Principles9 to synthesize a test for universal
justiciability. The resultant formula constitutes a middle ground consistent with prior
precedent on the ATCA and universal jurisdiction which serves the United States’ policy
goals better than either the piracy or torture paradigms. Finally, it answers several main
objections to this conception of the ATCA and to modern universal jurisdiction generally.
Throughout, I engage particularly with Professor Eugene Kontorovich’s article
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Teaches About the Limits of the
Alien Tort Statute,10 the most salient post-Sosa argument for a narrow interpretation of
the ATCA.
II. Existing Law
A. The ATCA and the Law of Nations Since 1789
The ATCA was passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. There is limited
legislative history, but the available evidence indicates that the Framers had intended the
ATCA to be self-executing.11 It lay largely in disuse between 1789 and 1980, though it
was successfully used as a jurisdictional nexus in two cases12 and recodified by Congress
twice with only cosmetic changes.13 In 1980, however, the Second Circuit resurrected it
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United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf.
10
See supra note 1.
11
See, e.g., 1 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 57, 59 (1795).
12
See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961), Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810
(D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). But see Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978), Benjamins
v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2nd Cir. 1978), inter alia (rejecting attempts
to use the ATCA as a jurisdictional nexus).
13
See Bradley supra note 1, at n.2, citing Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat.
1087, 1093 (1911); Revised Statutes tit. 13, ch. 3, § 563, para. 16 (1873).
9
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in Filartiga. Since then, it has been used to bring suit against political leaders14 as well as
corporations15 for violations of international law.16
International law, however, grew and changed, increasingly incorporating
recognition of the rights and duties of individuals as well as nation-states, and developing
international institutions to better regulate those rights and duties.17 These advances have

14

See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp. 2d 401 (S.D. N.Y.2002), Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996), Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.
1996) (upholding recovery for plaintiff under ATCA), Abiola v. Abubakar, 267 F.Supp.
2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying Nigerian general’s summary judgment motion), Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding damages against Guatemalan
generals under the ATCA), Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995) (upholding
recovery for plaintiffs under ATCA), Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 357
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted and judgment vacated and case remanded for
reconsideration, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (June 14, 2004).
15
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D. N.Y. 2003), Sarei v. Rio
Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 288 F. Supp. 2d. 1379 (JPML 2002).
16
Filartiga read the ATCA very broadly. See infra note 39. There was considerable
support for this position in the ensuing litigation. See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 103-105
(holding that the ATCA "reflects a United States policy interest in providing a forum for
the adjudication of international human rights abuses," because "the law of nations is
incorporated into the law of the United States" and "a violation of the international law of
human rights is (at least with regard to torture) ipso facto a violation of U.S. domestic
law"), Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848 (holding that the ATCA gives domestic tribunals the
power to "fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of
customary international law"). However, some courts subscribed to a strictly
jurisdictional reading of the ATCA. See Al Odah v United States, 321 F3d 1134, 1146-47
(DC Cir 2003) (Randolph concurring), Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 534 (2003), cert granted
in part, 124 S Ct 534 (2003) (arguing that the ATCA does not, and should not, provide a
cause of action); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774, 801, 808 (Bork
concurring).
17
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 101 (1987) (“International
law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general application
dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical”) with Jeremy Bentham (who coined the term “international law”), Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6, 296 & n.x (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.,
1970) (excluding transactions involving individuals from province of "international
jurisprudence,” which referred only to “transactions between sovereigns as such”).
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created what David Hirsh calls “cosmopolitan law.”18 Cosmopolitan law, though it has
some roots in Greek and Roman thought,19 is most commonly traced to Immanuel Kant.20
In positive law, it is typically viewed as commencing with the Nuremberg trials21 and
developing through a variety of ensuing international agreements.22 Richard J. Goldstone
argues that its international use diminished during the Cold War, but has revitalized since
1991 due to the activity of tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well
as the International Criminal Court (ICC).23 As Vaclav Havel perhaps overstates it, “The
enlightened efforts of generations of democrats, the terrible experience of two world
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See, e.g., Hirsh, David, LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE, Glasshouse (2003). Professor
Hirsh defines cosmopolitan law as “aim[ing] to protect human rights of individuals and
of groups, primarily from serious threats that may be posed to them by their ‘own’ states,
invading states, or other state-like structures.” Id. at XV.
19
See, e.g., Geoffrey Robertson, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, New Press (2000), at
1 (describing the Roman concept of jus gentium – literally ‘law of nations’ – as “rules
which they discovered to be common to all civilized societies and which might therefore
be catalogued specially as a kind of international law”).
20
See, e.g., Kant, Immanuel, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795).
21
See Brigadier General Telford Taylor, U.S.A., Chief of Counsel for War Offenses,
Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Offenses Trials Under
Control Council Law No. 10, at 109 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1997) (Aug. 15, 1949)
("[T]he major legal significance of the [Nuremberg] ... judgments, lies ... in those
portions of the judgments dealing with the area of personal responsibility for international
law offenses.") But see U.S. STATE DEPT. PUB. NO. 3080, REPORT OF ROBERT H.
JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 437 (1949)
(arguing that crimes against humanity were “implicitly” in violation of international law
even before Nuremberg).
22
See, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN GAOR, Supp. No. 16, UN Doc.
A/6316 (1948); Geneva Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (Fourth)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR, 3 rd Comm., 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200A (XXI) (1966).
23
See Goldstone, Richard J., FOR HUMANITY, New Haven 2000 at 75. Indeed,
Kenneth Roth calls the time between 1948 and the end of the Cold War “the lipservice
era for human rights.” Robertson, supra note 9, at xxiii.
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wars… and the evolution of civilization have finally brought humanity to the recognition
that human beings are more important than the state.”24
Professor Kontorovich views customary international law as simply the modern
rendering of the law of nations.25 If we accept this picture, then the scope of causes of
action under the ATCA will have grown considerably since 1789 because of the
revolution in cosmopolitan law. This is the Filartiga outlook – an expansive conception
of the modern role of the ATCA – and though the specific test laid out in Filartiga may
represent an overreaching, the revolution in cosmopolitan law affects every aspect of the
ATCA’s evolution between the Judiciary Act and Sosa.
B. The Piracy Paradigm
Advocates of the piracy paradigm have argued both that the ATCA should be
restricted to the Blackstonian offenses and that it may include offenses which share their
definitional characteristics. Professor Eugene Kontorovich bridges that gap by detailing
six “salient characteristics” of the Blackstonian torts26:
1) Universal Condemnation27

24

Vaclav Havel. “Kosovo and the end of the Nation-State,” New York Review, June 10
1999, as cited in Noam Chomsky, A NEW GENERATION DRAWS THE LINE, Verso,
London: 2000, at 2. This claim was anticipated two centuries earlier by Judge James
Wilson: “A state, useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is but the inferior contrivance
of man; and from his native dignity derives all its acquired importance.” Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 455 (1793). But see Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political
Communities, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, ed. Beitz, Cohen, Scanlon, and Simmons,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey: 1985, at 168 (noting that a challenge
to state sovereignty is also a challenge to the rights of an individual citizen “to live in
[his] own historical communit[y], in which conflict and controversy about political and
social arrangements are appropriately worked out by the members themselves according
to their own traditions”).
25
Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 113.
26
Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 116.
27
Standards of proof for universal condemnation vary. Compare Mendonca v Tidewater,
Inc, 159 F Supp 2d 299, 301-02 (ED La 2001), aff’d 33 Fed Appx 705 (5th Cir 2002)
6

2) Narrow and universally agreed-upon definition
3) Universal agreement on punishment
4) Specific rejection of the protection of their home states28
5) Occurrence on the high seas, rather than in any state’s territory
6) Equal threat to all states from the offense’s commission
Using those characteristics as definitional of the Blackstonian offenses, he argues that no
offenses are sufficiently analogous to piracy to merit expanding the list of actionable torts
under the ATCA.
Advocates of this paradigm also often argue that a more expansive interpretation
of the text will endanger important United States economic or security interests. In Doe,
the State Department notified the trial judge of the “potentially serious adverse impact [of
that litigation] on significant interests of the United States, including interests related
directly to the on-going struggle against international terrorism.”29 Litigation against
transnational corporations involved in dealings with rights abusers can also pose
significant economic risks.30
This paradigm is dubious for two primary reasons. First, the Sosa court explicitly
upheld Filartiga, and a literal read of Kontorovich would suggest that torture should not

with Tachiona v Mugabe, 234 F Supp 2d 401, 439-40 & n 153 (SDNY 2002) (reaching
different conclusions about whether the same body of treaties constituted universal
condemnation of racial discrimination).
28
Pirates could become privateers legally by obtaining letters of marque. See
Kontorovich, supra note 1, at 116.
29
Letter of William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, to Hon. Louis F. Oberdorfer (July 29,
2002).
30
The Court in Sosa did not specifically address whether the ATCA provides a cause of
action against corporations for aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations. For a
discussion of the purported economic costs of ATCA litigation against MNC’s, see
Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening
Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (2004).
7

be actionable under the ATCA31 – as a result, this paradigm’s explanatory power is
limited. Second, Kontorovich rests his argument on one particular definition of the nature
of piracy (and so one particular description of the offense to which other offenses must be
sufficiently analogous). However, this articulation is not based in any authoritative
American jurisprudence on the subject. There are other ways to describe piracy, for
instance as the only universal jurisdiction offense of the time, which naturally lead to
other implications for modern jurisprudence. Kontorovich’s description of piracy is not
the only description, nor is it a particularly compelling one as a matter of law, and so
neither is his inference the only inference.32
The Sosa court upheld judicial recognition of new causes of action, noting that the
First Congress had granted such discretion and no subsequent Congress had seen fit to
remove it.33 However, criticisms of the ATCA’s impact on the national interest should
not be tossed easily aside, since a belief that fulfilling international obligations was in the
national interest played a major role in the Framers’ sympathy to international law.34
Perhaps for this reason, the Sosa court advised deference to the executive in determining
whether particular ATCA litigation is conducive to the national interest.35
C. The Torture Paradigm
31

For instance, torturers cannot escape prosecution by obtaining letters of marque, so
torture does not meet the piracy analogy as Kontorovich construes it. Nor does torture
necessarily occur in a place where it would be difficult to enforce domestic or
international laws against it, nor is there universal agreement upon its punishment.
32
For a criticism of the piracy-universal jurisdiction analogy, see Eugene Kontorovich,
The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. J.
INT’L. L. 184, 202 n.111 (2004).
33
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2764-65 (“For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law
of the United States recognizes the law of nations. It would take some explaining to say
now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm
intended to protect individuals." (citations omitted)).
34
See Stephens, supra note 3.
35
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2765-66.
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Torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted” for purposes ranging from obtaining a
confession to extracting information, coercing, or punishing with official sanction.36 Yet
torture is a peculiar crime. Of all commonly cited jus cogens offenses, it is the only one
serious scholars argue can be morally permitted.37 Yet it is the only offense to which
ATCA jurisdiction has been specifically extended by the Supreme Court and Congress,
and internationally enjoys a level of opprobrium comparable to offenses like genocide
and crimes against humanity.38 I do not attempt to explain in full torture jurisprudence
and scholarship here. However, it is necessary to keep torture’s peculiarity in mind to
understand its implications for the applicability of the ATCA to other offenses.
Filartiga held that customary international law was incorporated “in toto” into
federal common law.39 In so doing, it laid out a two-pronged test for judiciability of
particular offenses under the ATCA:
1) Near universal condemnation40
36

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, December 10,
1984, executed in U.S. law by 18 U.S.C. § 2340. Torture may also include sexual
violence. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
37
See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 3 (Aug. 1, 2002), Alan Dershowitz, Is
There a Torturous Road to Justice?, Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2001. One
important ramification of this controversy is that torture does not seem to enjoy universal
moral condemnation in state practice. However, those who seek to justify torture
generally do so only in a very narrow range of “ticking-bomb” cases, and the difference
between torture and other jus cogens violations may only be that the other offenses do not
tend to be useful in such cases. There is a clear consensus that torture is inappropriate
absent such a justification.
38
See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 31. See also Regina v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochest Ugarte, House of
Lords, 2000 1 App. Cas. 147.
39
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 855.
40
Id. at 880 (“In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous international
agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually
9

2) Defined specifically41
This test is very similar to the test for whether a particular action is in violation of
customary international law.42 Indeed, the Second Circuit held that torture is justiciable
under the ATCA because official torture “violates established norms of the international
law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.43”
While many have noted that the Court has held that “international law is our
law,”44 this is only true in the absence of a controlling executive or legislative act to the
contrary.45 As a result, many norms of customary international law are not incorporated
into U.S. law, and so cannot constitute causes of action for ATCA litigation.
Considerable scholarship both in support of and opposed to the Filartiga holding was
generated in the next few years.46

all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we find that an act of
torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations”). While this
condemnation is not in fact universal, torture may provide some standard for what
constitutes a sufficient international consensus. See supra note 16.
41
See, e.g., Sosa at 2769, 2776.
42
See Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001), citing North Sea Continental Shelf
(Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/The Netherlands)
1969 I.C.J. 51/52 (Feb. 20) & RESTATEMENT § 102 (2) cmt. k. & reporters’ n. 6.
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”).
43
Filartiga at 880. See, e.g., Flores v. South Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 149-50 (2d
Cir. 2003) (“The Filartiga Court not only held that § 1350 provides a jurisdictional basis
for suit, but also recognized the existence of a private right of action for aliens… seeking
to remedy violations of customary international law or of a treaty of the United States”).
44
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
45
Id. As a result, it is possible that “no enactment of Congress may be challenged on the
grounds that it violates customary international law.” Wade Estey, The Five Bases of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 177, 180 (1997).
46
See Jeffrey H. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 H ARV.
INT’L L. J. 53 (1981); Lisa A. Rickard, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A New Forum for
10

In 1991, Congress expressly ratified Filartiga with its enactment of the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA).47 The TVPA supplemented the ATCA and extended
similar civil remedies to U.S. citizens tortured or killed abroad by a defendant acting
under actual or apparent state authority.
The torture paradigm, however, was rejected in Sosa. Indeed, the Sosa court
described the wholesale incorporation of customary international law into American law
for ATCA purposes as “frivolous” and “implausible.48” Since this wouldbe closely akin
to the torture paradigm, the paradigm cannot be reconciled with Sosa and a middle
ground between the two paradigms is necessary.
D. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The case arose from the 1985 seizure of a Mexican national, Humberto AlvarezMachain, on suspicion of assisting in the torture of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
agent. When extradition attempts failed, the DEA contracted with Mexican nationals,
including Jose Francisco Sosa, to abduct Alvarez-Machain from his home and bring him
to the United States so he could be arrested by federal officers.49 After a lengthy and
unsuccessful procedural challenge,50 Alvarez-Machain was acquitted at trial on a directed

Violations of International Human Rights, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 807 (1980 – 1981), Richard
A. Conn, Jr., The Alien Tort Statute: International Law as the Rule of Decision, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 874 (1980 – 1981), Marc P. Jacobsen, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal
Remedy for Torture in Paraguay?, 69 GEO. L. J. 833 (1980-1981), Michael Danaher,
Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 S TAN. L.
REV. 357 (1980-1981), Thomas E. Grossmann, Torture as a Tort in Violation of the Law
of Nations, Giving Rise to Federal Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Whenever
an alleged Torturer, Regardless of Nationality, Is Served with Process by an Alien Within
the Borders of the United States, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 880 (1980)
47
28 U.S.C. §1350.
48
Sosa,124 S.Ct. at 2756.
49
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
50
See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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verdict.51 In 1993, he returned to Mexico and commenced a civil suit against the United
States and Sosa for his allegedly arbitrary arrest and detention, using the ATCA as a
jurisdictional hook.
The Sosa Court carved a compromise between the two paradigms, holding that
while the first Congress did not intend to incorporate the law of nations in toto as in
Filartiga, it did intend to create a cause of action for the specific violations noted above
and envision that courts would eventually grant a similar cause of action for substantially
analogous torts, describing those as the “principal” justiciable offenses, rather than the
only justiciable offenses, under the ATCA.52 The Court’s opinion in Sosa notes, in fact,
that some particularly prominent international conventions like the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights (UNDHR) are insufficient in themselves to provide a cause of action for
individual plaintiffs.53
The Court held that a legitimate ATCA claim should “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized [i.e.,
violations of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy].”54
Further, the norm must extend liability to the type of defendants under suit, and not be

51

Trial judge Edward Rafeedie noted that the prosecution of Alvarez-Machain appeared
based on “wild speculation” and “hunches.” See, e.g., Respondent’s Brief for Humberto
Alvarez-Machain in Sosa, at 2.
52
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2773-74. Indeed, the Court considers the interpretation that all
violations of the law of nations are judiciable under the ATCA “frivolous” and
“implausible.” Id. at 18. For a discussion of the implications of the ATCA and its limited
incorporation of international law on non-delegation doctrine, see Edward T. Swaine, The
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004).
53
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2757.
54
Id. at 2751-52.
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preempted by explicit or implicit Congressional action. The executive branch also may
discourage courts from finding a particular tort actionable, and that determination will
55
carry significant weight. While rejecting the ICCPR and UNDHR as causes of action

and counseling restraint in identifying new causes of action, the Court explicitly states
that “some, but few” torts are justiciable under the ATCA.56 Tortious arrest, however, is
not one of those few, as it is not defined with sufficient specificity.57 As a result, while the
importance of Sosa was recognized immediately, its meaning is still subject to debate.58
III. A Middle Ground
Neither the piracy paradigm nor the torture paradigm can be reconciled with the
holding in Sosa. The piracy paradigm is inconsistent with the Sosa court’s endorsement
of Filartiga,59 and the torture paradigm is explicitly rejected.60 The piracy paradigm
cannot explain why torture is actionable, and the torture paradigm cannot explain why
tortious arrest (or any violation of international law) is not, so some synthesis of the two
positions is necessary to create a test for actionable torts which is reasonable and
consistent with Sosa. Unfortunately, the Court’s holding itself is under-theorized and
provides only limited guidance if ATCA claims are brought for other international torts.

55

Id. at 2765-66. One justice suggests adding a consideration of the effect on international
comity of incorporating a particular tort. Id. at 44 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment). See also Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal
Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (“There is a particular imperative of judicial nonintervention in matters of international relations, which are more appropriately left to the
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Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2749.
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Id. at 2769.
58
See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 6 (“Indeed, Sosa may stand with Sabbatino as one of the
Court’s seminal decisions on the relationship between international and U.S. domestic
law”).
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It is possible, though unlikely, the court may have endorsed Filartiga simply due to the
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60
See supra note 48.
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American courts have held that “Universal jurisdiction is a doctrine of
international law allowing states to define and punish certain offenses considered to be of
‘universal concern.’”61 However, neither universal jurisdiction62 nor jus cogens63 has
been recognized as providing a useful limiting principle for ATCA actions.
I argue, contra Kontorovich, that universal jurisdiction64 provides the proper
analogy for ATCA causes of action.65 When courts deem universal jurisdiction
appropriate, prosecutions may occur even though there is no causal nexus between the
forum state and the offense.66 The ATCA’s grant is similar in form; no language in the
Judiciary Act requires any connection between the tort at issue and the United States.
"The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain offenses
are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled - and even obliged - to
bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the offense or the
nationality of the perpetrator or victim.”67 The ATCA is grounded in the similar desire to
make victims of some types of wrongs whole regardless of where those wrongs are

61

See United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
See Kontorovich at 127-36.
63
See Respondent’s Brief at 45-47 (arguing that Paquete Habana demonstrates by
incorporating the international norm against interference with domestic fishing vessels in
times of war without arguing it is a jus cogens norm that jus cogens is not required).
64
Universal jurisdiction to prescribe particular actions may be either conditional or
absolute. See A. Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
65
Kontorovich recognizes that the ATCA and universal jurisdiction are analogous in
form. “A unique and controversial component of [ATCA] litigation has been the exercise
of universal jurisdiction by U.S. courts.” Kontorovich at 128, citing Robert H. Bork,
Judicial Imperialism, WALL STREET J. A16 (July 12, 2004). As I demonstrate, this
exercise is not at all unique.
66
See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 371 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Where
a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no links…
with the offender or victim.” (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 404 cmt. A). See,
e.g., Kontorovich at 128, explaining what types of causal nexi may otherwise confer
jurisdiction.
67
Mary Robinson. Forward to the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, at 16.
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committed.68
A. Universal Jurisdiction Offenses69
The Princeton Principles provide an illustrative list of “serious offenses” under
international law amenable to the exercise of universal jurisdiction: 1) piracy; 2) slavery;
3) war crimes; 4) crimes against humanity; 5) crimes against peace; 6) genocide; and 7)
torture.70 This list does not bar the application of universal jurisdiction to other
offenses,71 but merely establishes that these offenses do merit the application of universal
jurisdiction. (For instance, it does not address the conflict between United States v.
Yousef72 and United States v. Yunis73 as to whether aircraft hijacking constitutes a
universal jurisdiction offense). These principles update the Restatement’s catalogue of
universal jurisdiction offenses: piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.74
The Princeton Principles also make clear that universal jurisdiction is selfexecuting: “With respect to serious offenses under international law as specified in
Principle 2(1), national judicial organs may rely on universal jurisdiction even if their
national legislation does not specifically provide for it.”75 However, like the Sosa court,
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See, e.g., Brandon HMA Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 625 (Miss. 2001) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“A plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to make him whole… and a
defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong”).
69
For one critique of universal jurisdiction, see George P. Fletcher, Against Universal
Jurisdiction, 1 J Int’l Crim. Just. 580 (2003).
70
Princeton Principles, supra note 9, at Art. 2(1).
71
Id. at Art. 2(2).
72
327 F.3d 56.
73
924 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“hijacking may well be one of the few offenses
so clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may assert universal
jurisdiction to bring offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial connection
to the hijacking and its citizens are not involved.").
74
RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 404.
75
Id. at Art. 3.
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the Princeton Principles provide no clear test for which offenses may be subject to
universal jurisdiction beyond the above liturgy.
Universal jurisdiction, though limited in application76 and inconsistent in practice,77
has been established as legitimate in at least some cases under both American78 and
international law.79 When discussing the concept, we must be careful to avoid the
“tendency… to elide prescription and enforcement, as well as an inattention to the
question of when the requisite prescriptive jurisdictional nexus must be present.”80
Instead, universal jurisdiction “is shorthand for universal jurisdiction to prescribe, and
refers to the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances where no other lawful
head of prescriptive jurisdiction is applicable to the impugned conduct at the time of its
commission,81” that is, no other nexus (like nationality jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction,
passive personality jurisdiction, or protective principle jurisdiction) connects the forum
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See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003) (surveying universal jurisdiction around the world and finding
only 20 cases in the past ten years).
77
See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 1 at note 60 (pointing out that Spain and Belgium,
two pioneers in the use of universal jurisdiction, had scaled back their jurisdictional
claims in 2003 to require a direct link between offense and forum state).
78
See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 105.
79
See Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol 1, 1977 (‘each High Contracting Party
shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed ... grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts’). But see Arrest Warrant Case, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijman and Buergenthal, at §
31 (‘No territorial or nationality linkage is envisaged, suggesting a true universality
principle .... But …the authoritative Pictet Commentary … contends that this obligation
was understood as being an obligation upon States parties to search for offenders who
may be on their territory. Is it a true example of universality, if the obligation to search is
restricted to their own territory? Does the obligation to search imply a permission to
prosecute in absentia, if the search had no result?’) See also Princeton Principles; Luis
Benavides, Introductory Note To The Supreme Court Of Spain: Judgment On The
Guatemalan Genocide Case, 42 I.L.M. 683 (2003), et al.
80
O’Keefe, Roger. Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 735, 736 (September, 2004).
81
Id. at 754-55.
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state to the offense.
Universal jurisdiction offenses must be defined specifically, as the Sosa court
requires. For instance, in Yousef, the Second Circuit held that the lack of an international
consensus on the definition of terrorism was a major reason that terrorism was not a
universal jurisdiction offense.82 The court held that the test for universal justiciability is
that “The historical restriction of universal jurisdiction to piracy, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity demonstrates that universal jurisdiction arises under customary
international law only where offenses (1) are universally condemned by the community
of nations, and (2) by their nature occur either outside of a State or where there is no
State capable of punishing, or competent to punish, the offense (as in a time of war).”83
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, defined universal jurisdiction as “appropriate for offenses
so heinous that any nation… may assert jurisdiction.84”
An objective test for universal jurisdiction would require (1) that the act in
question be defined specifically, as in Yousef, and (2) that it be in violation of
international law. It would then consider either or both (3) the lack of a competent forum
state and (4) the heinousness of the act in question.85 For purposes of this paper, I
advocate considering both but requiring a specific minimum level for neither – that is,
taking a holistic approach to the competence of other forum states and the heinousness of
the act to balance the general goal of prosecuting offenses in their logical forum states
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See, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91.
Id. at 105. See also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of
War Offenses, 2 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 58, 65 (1944) (first proposing universal jurisdiction
over individual war criminals).
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United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994), citing to RESTATEMENT
§ 402 cmt. A.
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I leave aside here questions of universal threat, since jurists’ understanding of hostis
humani generis has modulated in the past two centuries. See infra notes 100, 101.
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and the principle that certain offenses are sufficiently heinous to cry out for justice,
regardless of who provides it. Finally, the objective test would consider policy concerns,
like the impact of exerting jurisdiction on international comity.
B. Specific Offenses and the Four-Pronged Test
The universal jurisdiction offenses enumerated by the Princeton Principles and
American law mostly pass this test, so it has the virtue of being consistent with existing
international law. It would not require replacing extant universal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Instead, the test merely supplements extant jurisprudence by providing a
consistent descriptive formula.
(1) Piracy
Piracy, the original universal jurisdiction offense, is inarguably subject to
universal jurisdiction.86 If it were not explicitly subject to universal jurisdiction, it would
still pass the four-pronged test: it is in violation of international law and defined
specifically,87 the locus delecti renders enforcement difficult, and it is normatively
heinous. Moreover, piracy is still a serious policy concern – over the past few years,
pirate attacks have increased in frequency around the world, and particularly in poorer
areas of Africa and Southeast Asia.88
(2) Slavery
86

See Yousef, supra note 74. See generally Kontorovich, supra note 1.
See UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 101 (defining piracy as an attack on a
ship or aircraft outside any state’s territorial jurisdiction).
88
See Piracy, Terrorism Threats Overlap, Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia,
Washington Times, July 6, 2003. See also Reports on Piracy, Fifty-Third Session
Agenda, 1998: Report of the Secretary General, V(A)(4)(146). Piracy’s increased
prevalence is due in part to difficulty finding effective anti-piracy strategies; see
Rodeman, Christopher A. In Search of an Operational Doctrine for Maritime
Counterterrorism. Newport, RI: United States Naval War College. Joint Military
Operations Dept., (November 28, 2003).
87
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The slave trade has been illegal under international law at least since the signing
of the Slavery Convention in 1926, and victims of slavery are also entitled to protection
under United States law.89 Slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised,”90 while
the slave trade “includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a
person with intent to reduce him to slavery... with a view to selling or exchanging him...
sale or exchange of a slave ... and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.”91
Currently, the slave trade goes on across the developing world,92 and even in some
corners of the developed world.93 President Bush has called for aggressive action against
the practice.94 Because it often stems from failed states or states where enforcement is
difficult,95 the slave trade meets the locus delecti prong, and has long been thought
normatively heinous.
(3) War Crimes
War crimes include “grave breaches” of the Geneva conventions, such as hostagetaking or murder, and other “serious violations” of the law of war, like targeting
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See Public Law No. 106-386, Division A, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act).
90
Slavery Convention, Art. I(1).
91
Id. at Art. I(2).
92
See, e.g., United States Department of State, “Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act 2000: trafficking in persons report," (2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003.
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., Matthew Continetti, Of human bondage: Bush calls for action against the
modern slave trade, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 6, 2003, p. 17-18.
95
See Martin Brass, The modern scourge of sex slavery, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, vol.27,
no.7, July 2002, p.62-5, 75; no. 8, Aug. 2002, p. 70-3, 80-1; no.9, Sept. 2002, p.56-9,
Jonathan Cohen, Borderline slavery: child trafficking in Togo, Human Rights Watch,
Apr. 2003, v. 15, no. 8 (A), 79+[5]p; Patricia Rho-Ng, Conscription: Asian sex slaves:
the development of Thailand's modern-day sex tourism industry, MONOLID MAGAZINE,
vol.2, no.3, Winter/Spring, 2002, p.10-13.
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civilians.96 Under U.S. precedent, war crimes are explicitly subject to universal
jurisdiction.97 They are also subject to universal jurisdiction under international law,98
and indeed several commentators have argued that ensuring justice in war crimes cases
rises to the level of a jus cogens obligation.99
Were war crimes not explicitly subject to universal U.S. jurisdiction, they would
still pass the four-pronged test: they are specifically defined violations of international
law,100 which occur by definition in war zones where enforcement is difficult, and are
normatively heinous.101
(5) Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity encompass a variety of acts “committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack.”102 Under American law, crimes against humanity are explicitly subject to
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Rome Statute, supra note 79, at Article VIII.
See Yousef, supra note 74.
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Mark S. Zaid, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, And Prospects: Will Or Should
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Marler, Note, The International Criminal Court: Assessing The Jurisdictional Loopholes
In The Rome Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 825 (1999); Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the
Exercise of Jurisdiction, in: The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary, Cassese, Gaeta & Jones (eds.), Vol. II, Oxford, (2002); Document
Submitted by the German Delegation to the Preparatory Committee of the ICC Statute,
A/AC.24971998/DP.2, 23 Mar. 1998.
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39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425 (1999).
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See supra note 94, inter alia.
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See Id. (defining willful killing, willfully causing serious injury, inhuman treatment,
wanton destruction of property, inter alia, as actionable war offenses under the Statute).
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Rome Statute, supra note 79, at Article VII.
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universal jurisdiction.103 These grave offenses differ from genocide insofar as they are
committed not against individuals viewed as members of certain protected groups, but
against individuals per se, with their own rights and dignity at stake.104
Were crimes against humanity not explicitly subject to universal jurisdiction,
they would still pass the four-pronged test: crimes against humanity are in violation of
international law, defined specifically, normatively heinous, and the locus delecti is the
middle of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against [a] civilian population.” In
such a situation, it is difficult to imagine the local forum state competently and equitably
providing enforcement.
(6) Crimes Against Peace
According to the International Law Commission, crimes against peace include
aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and offenses against United
Nations personnel.105 Previously, crimes against peace had been defined as “planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”106 The second definition is
more salient for our purposes, as the first encompasses other offenses already shown to
be appropriate subjects for universal jurisdiction.107

103

See Yousef, supra note 74.
See Luban, supra note 82.
105
International Law Commission: Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, Commission Report A/48/10 (1996).
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Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal, Article VI(a). The tribunal termed aggression “the
supreme offense.” United States v. Göring, Judgment (1946).
107
Offenses against United Nations personnel may be appropriate subjects for universal
jurisdiction, depending on the circumstances surrounding the act in question. Picking the
pocket of a UN official, for instance, is not an appropriate subject for universal
jurisdiction.
104
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Aggressive war has long been illegal,108 and is specifically forbidden by the
United Nations Charter.109 This ban constitutes a jus cogens norm of international law,
from which no derogation is permitted.110
In cases of aggression, the locus delecti cannot help but be in the middle of a war
zone, and if the declarer does not have broad enough popular support to make a fair
proceeding impossible, he will likely be unable to initiate hostilities in the first place.
Moreover, even aggression tends to be justified as defensive, and local courts will likely
defer to executives in making such determinations.111 These difficulties are endemic of a
larger problem: “aggression” does not have a specific, universally accepted definition,
despite a 1974 United Nations resolution which attempted to provide one.112 Though the
United Nations charter can be read narrowly to permit the use of force only in response to
“armed attack,113” states have claimed broader rights: to use force to pre-empt an
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See Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(Kellogg-Briand Pact), Aug. 28, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.
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See, e.g., Art. 2 (4).
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See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.
14, 100.
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See Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Reichstag, October 6, 1939 (arguing that alleged Polish
mistreatment of German and Czech nationals, inter alia, was sufficient to constitute jus
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64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 811.
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G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.G.A.O.R., 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 143, UN Doc. A/9631
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102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324 (2002). One commentator suggests that aggression may be
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a justification in international law. Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, PreEmption, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 259, 263 n.5 (1991).
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imminent threat,114 prevent a more distant one, protect their citizens abroad,115 retaliate
against those who harm them,116 or promote human rights.117 As a result, crimes against
peace are not defined specifically enough to be appropriate subjects for universal
jurisdiction.
(6) Genocide
Under international law, genocide is defined as “any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.”118 The United States adopted this definition in the Genocide
Convention Implementation Act in 1988, adding only that “intent to destroy, in whole or
114

The right to pre-empt imminent armed attacks is protected by customary international
law. John D. Becker, The Continuing Relevance of Article 2(4): A Consideration of the
Status of the U.N. Charter’s Limitations on the Use of Force, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. AND
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115
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SELF-DEFENCE 203-37 (2001).
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Whiteman, Digest of International Law § 4 at 148, 149 (GPO 1971).
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in part,” must mean intent to destroy in substantial part.119 Genocide is traditionally
considered the most repugnant offense an individual can commit,120 and while it may be
committed by individual actors121 generally it is difficult to prove without the backing of
an organization or system.122 International tribunals have found genocide in the
Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and Congress declared in July 2004 that the atrocities
currently being perpetrated in Sudan constitute genocide.123
(7) Torture
Torture is expressly actionable due to the TVPA124 and would likely be actionable
under our four-pronged test as well. Torture is in violation of international law and
defined specifically.125 Since it must be committed by or with the consent or
acquiescence of a state official,126 the competence of the forum state will always be
called into question to some degree. Further, while torture under some circumstances may
be morally ambiguous, much torture – to punish, intimidate, or coerce, for instance – is
unquestionably normatively heinous and a proper subject for universal jurisdiction.
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III. Law, Policy, and the ATCA
Justice Breyer wisely notes the import of restraining the ATCA to avoid
negatively impacting international comity, “a matter of increasing importance in an ever
more interdependent world.”127 Indeed, the Court notes the likelihood that the ATCA was
specifically targeted at a “narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a
judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in international
affairs.”128 As Justice Breyer suggests, this indicates that the ATCA was intended to
promote international harmony, and a reading not conducive to that goal should be
rejected.129 However, the advancement of human rights, too, is important to
understanding the ATCA in context; the Framers conceptualized the United States as a
“city upon a hill,” to which the world might look for moral leadership.130 The ATCA,
then, should be interpreted to promote the twin goals of comity and respect for rights.
The piracy paradigm does not impugn comity, nor threaten the sovereignty of
other judicial systems. However, it is nonetheless inadequate as a policy tool because it
fails to advance desirable ends like respect for human rights and restitution for victims of
particularly grave offenses.
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Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that courts help the laws of
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The torture paradigm, on the other hand, allows for restitution in American courts
for every person victimized by a violation of international law. However, its impingement
on comity may be excessive, since it would place no restraints on American courts’ rights
to hear cases without a traditional jurisdictional nexus. There are clearly some torts
(vandalism of property, for instance) which are inappropriate subjects for litigation in
American courts absent such a nexus. This litigation would not be inappropriate in and of
itself, but instead would be inappropriate because it would not sufficiently relate to
American interests to justify allowing access to American courts; the risk to American
interests in comity and international harmony would outweigh the benefit in providing
justice for the victims.
The universal jurisdiction paradigm provides a reasonable balance between these
competing interests. Comity is not impugned, because any offenses made civilly
actionable under the ATCA would already be criminally actionable, and there is no
particular reason to think that civil liability is more of a risk to comity than criminal
liability. Moreover, the universal jurisdiction paradigm allows for promotion of human
rights, since victims of heinous offenses in places where enforcement is difficult will now
have a clear route to restitution.
IV. Objections
A. Does the Federal Courts’ Power to Recognize New Causes of Action Violate Erie?
As noted earlier, the Sosa court held that the judicial branch could recognize new
causes of actions for ATCA suits consistent with the First Congress’ intent.131
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See infra note 21.
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Nonetheless, previous commentators132 and one dissenter133 argued that the elimination
of the federal common law in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins134 precluded judicial recognition of
new causes of action. Justice Scalia writes, “The question is not what case or
Congressional action prevents federal courts from applying the law of nations as part of
the general common law; it is what authorizes that particular exemption from Erie’s
fundamental holding that the federal common law does not exist.”135
However, Justice Scalia’s interpretation implies that the Erie Court was
empowered to abrogate the Congressionally granted power to recognize new ATCA
causes of action.136 As he writes, a federal common law has developed “for a ‘few and
restricted’ areas in which ‘a federal rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely
federal interests, and those in which Congress has given the federal courts the power to
develop substantive law.’”137 Justice Scalia further concedes that the First Congress had
intended to bestow the power of recognizing new ATCA causes of action upon the
judiciary.138 He suggests, however, that Erie reshaped the federal common law in a way
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that rendered the original grant of authority illegitimate.139 But since causes of action may
still be discovered in certain pressing federal cases,140 including some about foreign
relations,141 the only relevant question is whether this is one such case. Since the initial
grant of authority was Congressional rather than a judicial assertion, it would be
reasonable to assume that this power grant is still within the legitimate scope of judicial
authority. Indeed, in Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine was entirely judicially created –
no Congressional statute legitimated the assertion of authority - so the mandate to
recognize new ATCA causes of action has a stronger underlying foundation. The
Sabbatino court justified the act of state doctrine by arguing that it had an important
bearing on the conduct of the country’s foreign relations and so was appropriate for
judicial scrutiny. Similarly, appropriate punishment for universal jurisdiction offenses is
of concern to all states.142 As a result, the nexus suggested by Sabbatino – important
federal interest – is also present in the cases of universal jurisdiction offenses, and so it is
consistent with prior Erie jurisprudence for the federal judiciary to recognize a cause of
action here.
Even further, some scholars have argued that the incorporation of international
143

law as federal common law was unaffected by Erie,

a position ratified by the

Restatement.144
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B. Does ATCA litigation unconstitutionally conflict with executive power?
Under this administration, the Department of Justice has reversed prior precedent
and adamantly opposed the use of the ATCA for human rights litigation.145 One major
argument has been that the ATCA oversteps the bounds of the judicial branch in crafting
foreign policy, where the executive branch has broad power.146 It has further been argued
that holdings declaring private corporations potentially liable for violations like forced
labor have a negative impact on American economic interests.

147

The Administration has,

for instance, argued that the ATCA “implicate[s] matters that by their nature should be
left to the political Branches…”148 However, as argued above, this particular right of the
judicial branch has been conferred by the political branches, under Congress’ power to
create and define the jurisdiction of federal district courts.149 And as the Sosa court noted,
succeeding Congresses’ deference to this particular grant of judicial power provides a
compelling argument in favor of the ATCA.
C. Does Paquete Mean All Violations of International Law Must Be Actionable?
Counsel for Alvarez-Machain argued that because the Paquete Habana Court did
not restrict the incorporation of customary international law into United States law
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generally, such incorporation must also be total for purposes of ATCA causes of action.150
However, this is incorrect. As Sosa makes clear, the ATCA does not in itself provide a
cause of action for any violations. Instead, it merely grants the federal courts jurisdiction
to recognize causes of action.151 As a result, the entirety of international law does not need
to be read into the ATCA’s jurisdictional grant – and, since it is not desirable as a matter
of policy to do so, courts should exercise discretion and limit the ATCA’s scope.152
D. Does the Piracy Analogy Preclude Recognition of Causes of Action for Some
Universal Jurisdiction Offenses?
The Sosa court held that newly recognized torts must be “sufficiently analogous”
153
to those intended by the First Congress. Under Professor Kontorovich’s description of

piracy, very few newly recognized torts would be so analogous. However, as argued
above, this constitutes only one rendering of the piracy analogy, and one that is less
useful than the universal jurisdiction understanding as a matter of policy.
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Professor Kontorovich describes six salient characteristics, notes that no
contemporary offenses possess the same component parts, and assumes arguendo that no
other offense will have them. Looking particularly to the element of rejection of
sovereign protection, he seems correct; no letters of marque exist for torturers,
genocidaires, or slave traders. His rendering would leave all modern offenses
insufficiently analogous.
Several commentators have argued contra Kontorovich that piracy was a
universal jurisdiction offense based in large part on heinousness. Witness Christopher C.
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Joyner: “Piratical acts were made subject to universal jurisdiction . . . because they were
155

considered particularly heinous and wicked acts of violence and depredation.”

However, Kontorovich argues convincingly that heinousness was not the defining
characteristic: acts equivalent to piracy were perfectly legal, and certainly not universally
barred, when committed with sovereign authorization – the letter of marque issued to
privateers.156 Still, heinousness is not the only possible grounding for the universal
justiciability of piracy other than Professor Kontorovich’s sextet of “salient
characteristics.” Indeed, only two of the six are explicitly referenced by the Sosa court,
specificity and uniform condemnation.157 The others are either unproductive,
anachronistic, or incorporated into our four-pronged test.
(1) Uniform Punishment
Professor Kontorovich argues this characteristic is important to prevent “forum
shopping,”158 an even more pressing concern because of the international non bis in idem
norm.159 As he writes, this exacerbates forum shopping because countries may be
concerned about differential punishment. However, the problem of forum shopping is
mitigated if one consideration in determining the appropriateness of universal jurisdiction
over a particular act is whether the forum state is capable of effective judicial remedy,
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since if the forum state is incapable of exercising judicial oversight than the lack of
alternative forums would leave victims without legal recourse. On balance, shopping
between universal jurisdiction forums is less harmful to the cause of justice than the
inability of victims of genocide, slavery, and torture to take legal action against their
persecutors. Professor Kontorovich does not address this important interest, referring
only to states’ interests in seeing their laws enforced. In 1789, this might have been a
proper perspective. However, in light of the revolution in cosmopolitan law which has
taken place in the interim, it seems impossible to provide a complete picture without also
accounting for the restitution interest of the victims of such heinous offenses.
(2) Rejection of Sovereign Protection
Pirates, by refusing to acquire letters of marque which would have legitimated their
actions, specifically rejected licensure from nation-states. While even in international law
prior to 1789 not all conduct could be justified by an assertion of power,
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since then a

much broader swath of conduct which cannot be legitimated under international law by
any authority on earth has been identified. Jus cogens norms, for instance, are peremptory
norms which override protections for sovereignty like the persistent objector exemption
to general rules of international law.
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Since sovereign protection is no longer as certain a

guarantor of legality, it stands to reason that declining such protection would also be less
important as a matter of law. Again, Professor Kontorovich does not consider the impact
of cosmopolitan law, but treats the fundamental principles of international law as if they
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had been frozen in time in 1789. Their development calls the import of this rejection for
modern piracy analogues into question; a robust analogy must take into account piracy’s
place in the context of the international law of the time as well as contextualizing modern
offenses in a very different international legal schema.
(3) The locus delecti makes enforcement difficult
It is important to note that Professor Kontorovich is not asserting that piracy’s
locus delecti – that is to say, the high seas – is specifically important. Indeed, this would
not be accurate. As he writes, “The real problem was not the formal jurisdictional status
of the high seas but the practical problem of enforcement.”
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Even had the high seas been

a jurisdictional no-man’s land, “pirates’ offenses did not take place in the water on the
high seas – they were committed onboard ships,” a locus where the territorial jurisdiction
of the nation-state who owned the ship has been traditionally respected.163 So when we
speak of “the practical problem of enforcement” of international law against piracy, it is
necessary to avoid confusing problematic enforcement with an inability to enforce. To be
analogous, a modern offense must only be one where enforcement is difficult, not one
where “universal jurisdiction was needed to fill in a jurisdictional lacunae.”
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Moreover, our test for universal jurisdiction focuses attention on exactly this factor,
as does American law on universal jurisdiction. Unquestionably, enforcement is difficult
in a forum state which is, for instance, embroiled in a civil conflict, particularly one with
a significant ethnic or religious component, or culpable in the offenses. As a result, in the
great majority of states where offenses actionable under the universal jurisdiction theory
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of the ATCA are committed, enforcement will be practically problematic in the same way
it was for piracy.
(4) Direct threat to many nations
Pirates were defined as hostis humani generis, the enemies of all mankind, by
Edward Coke.
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As Kontorovich notes, for pirates were generally considered hostis

humani generis not due to their normative heinousness but due to concrete threats posed
to all nations.166 Torturers and others who commit modern universal jurisdiction offenses
tend to be considered hostis humani generis due to heinousness instead. The question,
then, is the extent of the disconnect: Are torturers “not really” hostis humani generis, as
the Sosa and Filartiga courts deemed them, or are they merely enemies of all mankind
for a different reason than pirates? If it is the latter, what implications, if any, does that
hold for modern universal jurisdiction?
Fortunately, the answer is simple: torturers are hostis humani generis due to
heinousness, even though pirates were not. The term has grown, like international law
itself, to encompass offenses which would not have been included before the revolution
in international cosmopolitan law.
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And just as it is appropriate to prosecute the enemies

of all mankind anywhere good people have the willingness and resources to do so, it is
appropriate to allow their victims to seek restitution in the United States, regardless of
where they are victimized.
V. Conclusion
The ATCA has inspired vigorous argumentation from those taking extreme
positions on both sides – some arguing that it may be used as a cause of action for all, or
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virtually all, torts in violation of the law of nations, and others arguing that it can be used
for none, or virtually none. This split in the Circuits and the academy was not much
clarified by the Supreme Court’s holding in Sosa that “some, but few” torts are actionable
under the ATCA. However, an accessible middle ground consistent with the Sosa court’s
opinion is available: as the ATCA provides for the universal extension of United States
civil jurisdiction, it ought be applied to acts which would meet the test for universal
criminal jurisdiction. A synthesis of available law and scholarship suggests that this test
focuses on whether the offense is in violation of international law, defined specifically,
committed in a locus delecti which impedes enforcement, and normatively heinous. The
offenses categorized by the Princeton Principles as appropriate for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction generally pass this test, and those that do mark the beginning of a
list of torts which should be actionable in American courts under the ATCA.
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